In this paper, we consider the problem of computing a low-rank factorization of an m × n matrix in the general turnstile update model. We consider both the private and non-private setting.
Introduction
In the list compiled by Dongarra and Sullivan [18] that "assemble the 10 algorithms with the greatest influence on the development and practice of science and engineering in the 20th century", the fourth entry is "The Decompositional Approach to Matrix Computation". Technically, matrix decomposition is not an algorithm, but its inclusion is often argued for by its immense application in many areas of computation [47] . An incomplete list of applications of matrix factorization includes data mining [4] , recommendation systems [21] , conic fitting problems [67] , information retrieval [55, 59] , system and control [46] , web search [1, 44] , chemometrics [60, 65] , clustering [14, 19, 48] , solving PDE [30, 31] , and learning distributions [2, 41] . For example, consider the following two graphs, G 1 and G 2 , defined over the set of vertices V := {Companies, Universities}, where Companies is the set of all companies and Universities is the set of all the universities in a particular country: Graph 1. In the graph G 1 , there is an edge between two nodes (u, v) ∈ V if there is a student who did his undergraduate from a university u and then moved to the company/university v. The weight on the edge is the number of all such students who moved from u to v after graduation.
Graph 2. The graph G 2 is a generalization of G 1 . The contribution of a person to the weight of an edge between two nodes (u, v) is proportional to the time spent after moving from u to v since graduation.
The weight on every edge (i, j) depends on the number of undergraduates who moved from i to j, this makes such graphs vital for companies and universities to target incoming graduates. One would, therefore, like to build a data mining system or a recommendation system based on the statistics of these graphs or perform efficient search of any entry in these graphs. In order to build such a system, let us look closely at some of the features of these graphs. The adjacency matrices of G 1 and G 2 have large Frobenius norms and can be dense (depending on the number of graduating students). Therefore, storing the graphs requires a lot of storage. Since students get an offer in an arbitrary order; G 1 is updated in a turnstile manner. Likewise people change job in arbitrary order during their career, i.e., G 2 is updated in a turnstile manner. This makes storing and updating a sketch, that allows efficient construction of a recommendation system or perform data-mining, challenging.
Low-rank approximation. To assuage these issues, a general technique used in the literature is to compute a low-rank approximation (LRA) of the adjacency matrix in the turnstile update model and use this approximation to perform all the computational tasks. This technique is used by many previous works where matrix factorization is used. As a result, LRA of large matrices (and not just adjacency matrices of graphs) has received a lot of attention in the recent past. Most of the proposed algorithms used either random sketching [11, 40, 58] or random sampling [3, 20, 22, 15, 29, 56, 57] . The run-time of these algorithms were improved substantially in subsequent works [13, 16, 45, 50, 54, 53, 58] . However, these works either assumed that the matrix is static or used a lot of storage when matrices are updated in the general turnstile manner. Recently, Boutsidis et al. [8] gave the first space-optimal and low communication cost algorithm to compute LRA; however, they do not optimize the computational cost of their algorithm.
Low-rank approximation and privacy. There is also a natural privacy concern associated with such graphs and many applications where LRA is used. The privacy issue has been recently exemplified by the deanonymization of Netflix datasets [52] and Hunch and Amazon [9] . In the latter case, no data is directly released (as in the Netflix challenge), but items similar to a given item are shown to the users. This was one of the motivations for the work of McSherry and Mironov [49] . Even training data of learning theoretic algorithms have natural privacy concerns. This motivated the line of research of differentially private learning [37, 61] .
Therefore, a more natural requirement would be to compute low-rank approximation of a matrix while providing some robust privacy guarantee, like differential privacy [24] . Differentially-private LRA has been studied by many recent works (see, Section 1.3 for more details), but these algorithms are optimized for the additive error incurred, and not for the space used by the algorithm or the computational cost to compute the LRA. Moreover, except for Dwork et al. [28] and Upadhyay [63] , none of the known results work in the streaming model. The algorithms of Dwork et al. [28] and Upadhyay [63] works only in the row-wise update model and not in the general turnstile update model as in G 1 and G 2 . Further, Dwork et al. [28] approximates only the right singular vectors.
Problem Description
In this paper, we study time-efficient and sublinear space algorithms for computing low-rank factorization when the input matrix is updated in a general turnstile manner (see Problem 1) . If there were no space or time constraints, then computing a low-rank factorization is equivalent to computing a low-rank approximation and we can use any of the earlier known results. However, under the time and space constraints considered in this paper, it is not clear how can we use a low rank approximation to get a low-rank factorization. In order to keep our results as general as possible, we do not assume any structure in the matrices, like symmetry or incoherence.
In the non-private setting, our goal is to construct a data-structure such that (i) the data-structure uses space sub-linear in the size of the data and its overall update time is linear in the sparsity of the private matrix, (ii) performing the low-rank factorization using these data-structures leads to a small multiplicative error. In the private setting, we further require that the data-structure does not lead to a privacy leak of the entries in the input matrix. We consider differential privacy for the privacy framework. Differential privacy is a well-established notion of privacy with many desirable features such as robustness and modular composition. Definition 1. A randomized algorithm M gives (ε, δ)-differential privacy, if for all neighbouring databases A, A and all subsets S in the range of M, Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(A ) ∈ S] + δ, where the probability is over the coin tosses of M.
Since we consider differential privacy in the streaming setting, we define it in terms of neighboring streams. Definition 2. A randomized algorithm M gives (ε, δ)-differential privacy in the streaming model, if for all neighbouring data-streams A, A and all subsets S in the range of M, Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(A ) ∈ S] + δ, where the probability is over the coin tosses of M.
Equipped with the above definition, we can define our model. We enumerate the key aspects of the (differentially private) turnstile update model of computation as follows.
• There are three entities: a stream generator S, a (database) curator C, and an analyst A. The stream generator S has a database matrix as input which it streams to the curator.
• S starts the process at time τ = 0 and C initializes its data structure to D 0 . The stream generator S provides C with the database matrix in a general turnstile manner, i.e., the stream consists of pairs (q, c τ ), where q ∈ [m] × [n] is the location and c τ is the item to be added or deleted at location q.
• C update its data structure to D τ using D τ −1 and the data received during the time τ . At any time, C uses space that is at most sublinear in the size of the streamed matrix. and takes total time that is linear in the length of the stream.
• Once the stream is over at τ , A requests C to perform certain tasks to which C responds using only D τ .
• In the setting of differential privacy, we further require that the responses of the curator should also satisfy Definition 2 for neighboring streams.
We can now define the problem that we consider in this paper. Problem 1. (α, β, γ, k)-LRF. Given parameters α, β, γ, a private m × n matrix A (received in a turnstile streaming model) and the target rank k, find a rank-k matrix factorization U k , Σ k , and V k such that
When privacy is also a concern, we require that the algorithm that computes (α, β, γ, k)-LRF also preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy. When an algorithm only outputs a rank-k matrix (and not a factorization), then we say that the algorithm computes (α, β, γ, k)-low rank approximation of the input matrix A.
Central to the notion of differential privacy is the concept of neighboring database. In this paper, we consider databases presented in the form of matrices. To motivate our definition of neighboring databases, we refer back to the graphs G 1 and G 2 . Graphs like G 1 are well studied in the literature of differential privacy (see, for example, [6, 28, 34, 33, 62, 63] ) under the privacy level known as edge-level privacy. In edge-level privacy, the presence or absence of a person corresponds to change in a single edge. On the other hand, graphs like G 2 are not very well studied. One of the main problems with such graphs is that a person might have been in many places during his career; thereby, presence or absence of a person would be reflected on many edges. The straightforward applications of earlier results on edge-level privacy [6, 34, 62, 63] to the graphs of form G 2 would lead to a large privacy loss. In this paper, we ask the question whether we can achieve comparable privacy loss in the scenario as in graph G 2 without compromising on the correctness or privacy loss. This motivates us to consider a stronger privacy level than edge-level privacy. We define our privacy level next.
Granularity of privacy. We consider two different levels of privacy. In the first level, Priv 1 , two databases are neighboring if the difference of their corresponding matrix representation has the form uv T for some unit vectors u and v. In the second level, Priv 2 , we consider two databases as neighboring if the difference of their matrix representations has Frobenius norm at most 1. Note that Priv 1 is a special case of Priv 2 . We consider two streams neighboring if they are formed by streaming neighboring matrices.
Our Contributions and Technical Overview
In this paper, we do not assume any upper bound on the Frobenius norm of the input matrix. For example, adjacency matrices corresponding to both G 1 and G 2 can have arbitrary large Frobenius norm. In fact, none of our results depend on the Frobenius norm, unlike some private algorithms [28, 34] . All of our results are for the turnstile update model. Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
1. Non-private fast and space-optimal algorithm. Our first result is a space-optimal and update time efficient algorithm for outputting LRF of a matrix in the turnstile update model. Our algorithm is different from Boutsidis et al. [8] . We show that one only need three sketches (one for approximating row-space, one for approximating column-space and one for approximating the matrix), and not five sketches as used by Boutsidis et al. [8] , to get similar bounds. Even if one does count the update-time efficiency, we believe that maintaining three sketches instead of five would be more efficient in actual implementation (and not asymptotic analysis).
Theorem (informal statement of Theorem 12). Let A be an m × n matrix with nn(A) non-zero entries. Then there is an algorithm that uses O β ((n + m)kα −1 ) space and runs in time O(nn(A))
where O β (·) hides a factor of poly (log(1/β)).
To prove our result, we give an alternate proof of one of the intermediate theorems of Boutsidis et al. [8] . Our alternate proof uses two optimization problems and uses the solution to these optimization problems. We feel that our proof is simpler. It also gives explicit optimum solutions to the two problems, which makes it easy to extend to (and get a tight bound in) the case of private low-rank factorization. We also prove a lemma (Lemma 13) that gives the best rank-k approximation of a matrix A in the terms of column-space and row-space of a sketch of the matrix A.
Optimality of the result. Clarkson and Woodruff [11] showed that, when the matrix is streamed in the turnstile model, any randomized algorithm that solves (α, 1/6, 0, k)-low rank approximation of an m × n matrix requires Ω((m + n)kα −1 ) words space. Therefore, our algorithm uses optimal space, up to a logarithmic factor.
2. Space-optimal private streaming algorithm. We also convert our non-private algorithm to give a private algorithm that is space-optimal under a stronger privacy level, Priv 1 (see, Section 1.2.1) in the general turnstile update model. The following is an informal statement of Theorem 15.
Theorem (informal statement of Theorem 15). Let A be an m × n matrix with nn(A) non-zero entries. Let p = max {m, n}. Then there is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that receives the private matrix in a turnstile streaming model, uses
where O δ (·) hides a factor of poly (log(1/δ)) and A k is the best rank-k approximation.
To preserve the privacy, we use both input and output perturbation. We also need to take care of the fact that Priv 1 is more general than the earlier works [6, 63, 64] (see Section 1.2.1). This requires us to generalize the previous privacy results [6, 63] . The specific choice of perturbation is crucial in getting a tight utility bound while preserving privacy. For example, one possibility could have been the input perturbation of the sketches Y r = ΨA and Y c = AΦ, for appropriate Φ and Ψ, followed by a multiplication by Gaussian matrices Ω 1 and Ω 2 as in [6, 63, 64] . If m ≤ n, one can prove that Y c Ω 1 is private, but since, Ω 2 Y r does not have a full-column rank, the multivariate Gaussian distribution is not defined. An attempt to consider the subspace orthogonal to the kernel space of Y r does not work because we cannot guarantee that both ΨA and ΨA have the same kernel for neighboring matrices A and A . Therefore, the privacy proof would not follow. On the other extreme, if we add random noise matrices to compute the sketches Y c = A Φ + N and Y r = ΨA + N , then we get
as one of the additive terms. This term can be arbitrary large if any of the singular values of A is too small, resulting in a large additive error. Our algorithm uses input perturbation with a careful choice of parameters to one of the sketches and output perturbation to the other two sketches so that we preserve privacy and still not incur a large additive error. To get a tight bound on the additive error due to one of output perturbations, we need our alternate proof of one of the theorems of Boutsidis et al. [8] .
Optimality of the result. We adapt the proof of Clarkson and Woodruff [11] to show that the space required by any randomized algorithm to solve (α, 1/6, O(m + n), k)-LRA is Ω((n + m)kα −1 ) (see, Theorem 41 for a formal statement). In other words, the space bound in the above theorem is optimal when k ≥ 1/α. Recall that Hardt and Roth [34] and Upadhyay [63] set α = √ 2 − 1. In other words, with their choice of parameters, we match the lower bound when k ≥ 3.
Hardt and Roth [34] showed that any differentially private low-rank approximation incurs an Ω( √ kn+ √ km) additive error by showing a reduction to the linear reconstruction attack [17] . They showed the lower bound when the differentially private mechanism can access the private matrix as many times as possible. Our bound matches the lower bound, up to a small multiplicative factor, while allowing the private mechanism to access the private matrix only in a turnstile manner.
3. Optimal error private streaming algorithm. Our last contribution is an algorithm that has constant update time and computes private low-rank factorization efficiently with an optimal additive error under the stronger level of privacy, Priv 2 (see, Section 1.2.1). Theorem (informal statement of Theorem 28). Let A be an m × n matrix with nn(A) non-zero entries. Then there is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that receives the private matrix in a turnstile streaming model, updates in O(log(m + n)) time, uses O δ ((m + nα −2 )kα −2 ) space, and outputs a rank-k factorization
Optimality of the result. The above result matches the run-time of the most efficient non-private algorithm up to a factor of α −3 [13, 50] . We match the lower bound of Ω( √ kn+ √ km) on the additive error given by Hardt and Roth [34] , up to a small multiplicative factor (and constant if α = √ 2 − 1), while allowing the private mechanism to access the private matrix only once and that, too, in a turnstile manner.
Comparison with Previous Works
Comparison of Non-private Algorithm. In the non-private setting, our algorithm runs in time O β (nn(A)+ (m + n)k 2 /α 2 + k 3 /α 3 ) and uses O((n + m)k log(1/β)/α) space. Clarkson and Woodruff [13] achieves a run time of O β (nn(A) + mk 2 /α 2 + nk 2 /α 4 ) and uses O β (mk/α + nk/α 2 ) space. Boutsidis et al. [8] gave the first space-optimal algorithm for low-rank approximation; however, they run in time O(mnk). After learning of this paper, Woodruff [66] showed that one can obtain the similar bound by using the embedding of Clarkson and Woodruff [13] in the protocol of Boutsidis et al. [8] . We tabulate our result with previous work in Table 1 .
Comparison of private algorithms (privacy level). The granularity of privacy used in this paper is more general than Blocki et al. [6] , Dwork et al. [28] , Hardt and Roth [34, 35] , Hardt and Price [33] , and Upadhyay [63] . One can consider that Priv 1 and Priv 2 lies between the node-level privacy [43] and edge-level privacy. For example, in the adjacency matrix corresponds to G 2 , every edge e = (u, v) is given a weight Time Space Clarkson-Woodruff [13] O 
Problem 2
Hardt and Roth [34] A
Hardt and Roth [34] 
Upadhyay [63] A Comparison of private algorithms (problem studied). There are few key differences between the problem that we study and the problems studied in previous works. All the previous private algorithms compute lowrank approximation (either of the matrix or its covariance). Though it is possible to compute the factorization of their outputs, this would incur an extra O(mn 2 ) running time for the factorization of an m × n rank-k matrix. Moreover, they require O(mn) space just to save the output (Dwork et al. [28] requires O(n 2 ), but they work with covariance matrices). We do not assume any upper bound on the Frobenius norm of the private matrix as in previous works (the result of Hardt and Roth [34] is applicable when m n and A F = O( √ n) and Dwork et al. [28] assume a normalized row assumption, i.e, A F = O( √ m)). On the other hand, G 1 and G 2 can have arbitrary large Frobenius norm. Apart from this, previous works, like [28, 42, 34, 33] , compute LRA under the spectral norm and Dwork et al. [28] only approximate the rightsingular vector. On the other hand, our algorithms outputs an approximation to both right and left singular vectors. We give the technical descriptions and the differences between Problem 1 and all the previously studied problems in Appendix C.
Quantitative comparison of private algorithms. Hardt and Roth [34] and Upadhyay [63] ) studied LRA in a model closest to ours. Therefore, we only compare this work with the results of Hardt and Roth [34] and Upadhyay [63] . We give a comparison of the results in Table 2 . Problem 2 differs from Problem 1 only in the sense that Problem 2 only requires the low-rank approximation while Problem 1 also requires low-rank factorization. Below, we enumerate the key differences between our result and previous results [34, 63] .
1. Additive error. Both of our bounds improves on Upadhyay [63] by a factor of k 3/2 α 2 log(1/δ). 
, where c is the maximum entry in the projection matrix. In other words, Theorem 15 improve the result of Hardt and Roth [34] by a c k log(1/δ) factor when m ≤ n.
2. Time and space efficiency. The result of Hardt and Roth [34] is applicable when the private matrix is not dense (see the discussion in Hardt and Roth [34, Sec 1.1]). However, their algorithm does not use low-sparsity of the input matrix. On the other hand, the running and update time of our algorithms depends on the number of non-zero entries of the input matrix and uses optimal space. Hardt and Roth [34] and Upadhyay [63] uses O(kmn) time and O(mn) space. Therefore, even if the matrix is not sparse, our algorithms are still more efficient in terms of both the space and time.
3. Streaming constraints. Hardt and Roth [34] is a private version of the two-pass algorithm of Halko et al. [32] . The algorithm of Upadhyay [63] is one-pass, but assumes that the matrix is streamed row-wise. A row-wise update is an easier problem (with respect to the space required) compared to the turnstile update model in the non-private setting as illustrated by Clarkson and Woodruff [11] .
4. Applicability. The result of Hardt and Roth [34] is applicable when the Frobenius norm is bounded by O( √ n) and m n. We do not put such restrictions on the size of m and n and the Frobenius norm.
Related Work
There has been a lot of work that used random projection [11, 40, 58] or random sampling [3, 20, 22, 15, 29, 56, 57] to give low-rank approximation. Many of the latter algorithms were improved substantially in the follow-up work [8, 13, 16, 45, 50, 54, 58] . Differential privacy was introduced by Dwork et al. [24] . Since then, many algorithms for preserving differential privacy have been proposed in the literature (see, Dwork and Roth [26] ). Dwork et al. [25] first considered streaming algorithms with privacy under the model of pan-privacy, where the internal state is known to the adversary. Subsequently, there have been some works on online private learning [28, 37, 61] for various tasks. There are some recent works on differentially private LRA as well. Blum et al. [7] first studied this problem in the Frobenius norm. This was improved by Hardt and Roth [34] under the low coherence assumption. Upadhyay [63] later showed that one can make the two-pass algorithm of Hardt and Roth [34] single-pass. Differentially-private LRA has been studied in the spectral norm as well by many works [10, 42, 35, 33] . Recently, Dwork et al. [28] gave a tighter analysis of the algorithm of Blum et al. [7] and used it to give a private online algorithm for covariance matrices.
Organization of the paper. In Section 3, we give our non-private algorithm for LRF in the general turnstile update model. In Section 4, we transform our non-private algorithm to a private algorithm under Priv 1 while incurring optimal additive error. In Section 5, we give an algorithm that has efficient update time under more finer granularity of privacy, Priv 2 .
Notations, Preliminaries, and Known Results
We let N to denote the set of natural numbers. We use bold-face capital letters to denote matrices and boldface small letters to denote vectors. We denote by 0 m×n the all-zero m × n matrix and by I n the n × n identity matrix. For a matrix A, we denote the best k-rank approximation of A by [A] k and its Frobenius norm by A F . The singular-value decomposition (SVD) of an m × n rank-r matrix A is a decomposition of A as a product of three matrices, A = UΣV T such that U ∈ R m×r and V ∈ R n×r has orthonormal columns and Σ ∈ R r×r is a diagonal matrix with singular values of A on its diagonal. For a matrix A, we use the symbol r(A) to denote its rank and ∆(A) to denote its determinant. If A = UΣV T with the diagonal entries of Σ being {σ 1 , · · · , σ r }, then ∆(A) = Π i σ i . The Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of a matrix A = UΣV T is denoted by A † and has a SVD A † = VΣ † U T , where Σ † consists of inverses of only non-zero singular values of A. A matrix A has a left-inverse (right-inverse, respectively) if and only if it has full column rank (full row rank, respectively). If A has a left-inverse, then
Probability theory. We use the notation Rad(p) to denote a distribution with support ±1 such that +1 is sampled with probability p and −1 is sampled with probability 1 − p. An n × n Walsh-Hadamard matrix H n is constructed recursively as follows:
and H 1 := 1. A randomized WalshHadamard matrix W n is formed by multiplying H n with a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are picked i.i.d. from Rad(1/2). We drop the subscript n where it is clear from the context. Given a random variable x, we denote by N (µ, ρ 2 ) the fact that x has a normal Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance ρ 2 . The multivariate Gaussian distribution is a generalization of univariate
is the N × N covariance matrix, has the probability density function given by PDF X (x) :=
. If Λ has a non-trivial kernel space, then the multivariate distribution is undefined. However, in this paper, all our covariance matrices have only trivial kernel. Multivariate Gaussian distributions is invariant under affine transformation, i.e., if y = Ax + b, where
Random Projections. We use various concepts and results from the theory of random projections.
Definition 3. Let α, β > 0. A distribution D over t × n random matrices satisfies (α, β)-Johnson-Lindenstrauss property (JLP) if, for any unit vector x ∈ R n , we have Φx 2 2 = (1±α) with probability 1−β over Φ ∼ D. Definition 4. A distribution D R of t × m matrices satisfies (α, β)-subspace embedding for generalized regression if it has the following property: for any matrices P ∈ R m×n and Q ∈ R m×n such that r(P) ≤ r, with probability
Definition 5. A distribution D A over t × m matrices satisfies (α, β)-affine embedding if it has the following property: for any matrices P ∈ R m×n and Q ∈ R m×n such that r(P) ≤ r, with probability 1 − β over
We use the symbol D R to denote a distribution that satisfies (α, β)-subspace embedding for generalized regression. We use the symbol D A to denote a distribution that satisfies (α, β)-affine subspace embedding. One example of a distribution that satisfies D R with t = O(α −2 log(1/β)) is the distribution of random matrices whose entries are sampled i.i.d. from N (0, 1/t). Sarlos [58] observed that a random matrix sampled from a distribution that satisfies the JLP is also a (α, β)-subspace embedding for generalized regression for rank-r matrix as long as it approximates matrix multiplication with multiplicative error α/r. The latter follows from the standard result on any transform with JLP with projected dimension t = O(r + log(1/β)/α 2 ). Using Indyk and Motwani [36] , we only need to project to a t = O(rα −1 log(1/β))-dimensional subspace. Since random Gaussian matrices satisfies the JLP, this implies the following fact. Fact 6. ( [39, 58] ) Let P ∈ R m×n be a matrix of rank r and Q ∈ R m×n be an m × n matrix. Let D be a distribution of matrices over R t×n with entries sampled i.i.d. from N (0, 1/t). Then there exists a 
. Update the matrices by the following rule:
Computing the factorization. Once the matrix is streamed, we follow the following steps.
1. Compute a matrix U ∈ R m×t whose columns are orthonormal basis for the column space of Y c and matrix V ∈ R t×n whose rows are the orthonormal basis for the row space of Y r .
Compute a SVD of SU. Let it be
4. Output the matrix UU compromising of left singular vectors, diagonal matrix Σ , and the matrix V T V with right-singular vectors. Denote by 
, then for any rank r matrix D ∈ R m×n and a matrix E ∈ R m×n , SE and
Differential privacy. We use the following results about differential privacy in this paper.
Lemma 9.
(Post-processing [23] ). Let M(D) be an (ε, δ)-differential private mechanism for a database D , and let h be any function, then any mechanism
) releasing the concatenation of each algorithm is (ε , δ + 0 + δ )-differentially private for ε < 2 ln(1/δ )ε 0 + 2 ε 2 0 . Theorem 11. (Gaussian mechanism [23] .) Let x, y ∈ R n be any two vectors such that x − y 2 ≤ c. Let ρ = cε −1 log(1/δ) and g ∼ N (0, ρ 2 ) n be a vector with each entries sampled i.i.d. Then for any s ⊂ R n ,
Optimal Space Streaming Algorithm for Low-rank Factorization
In this section, we present our non-private algorithm. Our algorithm is different from that of Boutstidis et al. [8] and has a nice symmetric form which allows us to extend this algorithm to the private setting. Our algorithm maintains three sketches (namely, Y r = ΨA for approximating the row-space, Y r = AΦ for approximating the column-space and Z = SAT T for approximating the matrix), instead of five sketches as maintained by Boutsidis et al. [8] , to get similar bounds. The main theorem of this section is stated below.
Theorem 12. Let m, n ∈ N and α, β be the input parameters. Let k be the desired rank of the low-rank factorization. Given an m × n matrix A in a turnstile model, the factorization U, Σ, V outputted by the algorithm Optimal-Space-LRF, presented in Figure 1 , is a k-rank factorization of the matrix A such that:
1. With probability 1 − O(β) over the random coins of the algorithm Optimal-Space-LRF,
2. Optimal-Space-LRF uses at most O((m + n)kα −1 log(1/β) log k) space.
3. The update-time of Optimal-Space-LRF is O(log(n + m)). The total time for the computation of low-rank factorization by Optimal-Space-LRF is O(nn(A) log(1/β))+O((m+n) log(1/β)k 2 α −2 ) time. 
Computing the orthonormal basis U and V requires nt
3. Computing the SVD of the matrix SU and TV T requires vt 2 + tv 2 = O(k 3 α −6 ).
Computation of
To prove part 1, we first invoke Theorem 50. Theorem 50 relates min X,r(X)≤k AΦXΨA − A F with
Since V is a matrix whose rows are an orthonormal basis for the row space of ΨA and U is a matrix whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space of AΦ, we have
Combining equation (1) and equation (2), we have with probability
Lemma 13. Let U and V be as defined above and X = argmin X,r(X)=k S(UXV T − A)T F . Let D A be a distribution that satisfies (α, β)-subspace embedding. Then with probability
Proof. Set p = k/α, D = U and E = A in the statement of Lemma 8 and v = O(k/α 3 log(k/α)). Let us restrict our attention to only rank k matrices X and denote by X = argmin X,r(X)=k UXV − A F and X = argmin X,r(X)=k S(UXV T − A)T F . Then we have with probability
Substituting D = V T , X = (SU X) T and E = (SA) T in the statement of Lemma 8, with probability
Combining equation (5) with equation (3) and equation (4), we have with probability 1 − O(β) over the coins of Optimal-Space-LRF,
This completes the proof of Lemma 13.
To finalize the proof of Theorem 12, we need to compute X = argmin X,r(X)≤k S(UXV − A)T T F . We use the following lemma to compute X. This lemma is a generalization of one of the previous results of Clarkson and Woodruff [11] . Lemma 14. Let R be a matrix with orthonormal rows and C be orthonormal columns. Then
Proof. For any matrix Y of appropriate dimension, we have F − CC T F, CC T F − CYR = 0. This is because F − CC T F = (I − CC T )F lies in space orthogonal to C(C T F − YR). By Theorem 45,
Again, for any matrix Y of appropriate dimensions, we have
R lies in the space spanned by R, and C T F − C T FR T R = C T F(I − R T R) lies in the orthogonal space. By Theorem 45, we have
F is independent of Y, we just bound the term C T FR T R − YR 2 F . Substituting Y = [CFR] k and using the fact that multiplying R from the right does not change the Frobenius norm and [C T FR T ] k is the best k-rank approximation to the matrix C T FR T , for all rank-k matrices Z, we have
Combining equation (9) with equation (8) and Theorem 45, we have
Combining equation (10) with equation (7), the fact that C has orthonormal columns, and Theorem 45, we have
F . This completes the proof of Lemma 14.
We now complete the proof of Theorem 12. Recall that SU = U s Σ s V T s and TV T = U t Σ t V T t . Invoking Lemma 14 with C = U s , R = V T t and F = Z = SAT T , we get
Substituting equation (11) in equation (6), and adjusting the value of α by a constant, we have the final result.
4 Space-Optimal Private Algorithm for Low-rank Factorization Under Priv 1
In this section, we convert the algorithm presented in the last section to a differentially private algorithm. When m ≤ n, we maintain sketches Y c = A Φ, Y r = Ψ A, and Z = S AT T for A = A σ min I m ; else we maintain Y r = ( A Φ) T , Y c = (Ψ A) T , and Z = (S AT T ) T for A = A T σ min I n . In this section, we consider Priv 1 as the granularity of privacy, a generalization of previously studied privacy levels [6, 28, 34, 33, 63] . Figure 2 give the description of our algorithm. Our main result in this section is as follows. Theorem 15. Let m, n, k ∈ N and α, β, ε, δ be the input parameters. Let s = max{m, n} and σ min = 16 log(1/δ) t(1 + α)(1 − α) −1 ln(1/δ)/ε. Given an m×n matrix A in a turnstile update model, PrivateSpace-Optimal-LRF, described in Figure 2 , outputs a factorization UU , Σ , V T V such that 1. With probability 1 − O(δ) − 2 − 2 v 2 /8 over the random coins of Private-Space-Optimal-LRF,
2. Private-Space-Optimal-LRF is (3ε, 3δ)-differentially private.
3. The space used by Private-Space-Optimal-LRF is O((m + n)(k + 1/α)α −1 log k log(1/δ)).
The initialization time of the algorithm is O(m+n)
, the update time is O(s 2 (k+1/α)α −1 ), and the total time to perform the factorization is O(nn(A) log(1/δ))+O((nk 2 α −2 +mk 2 α −2 +k 3 α −4 ) log(1/δ)).
Part 4 and 3 of Theorem 15 follows as in the proof of Theorem 12 by setting the values of t and v. Note that here the update time also requires multiplication by a random Gaussian matrix. In Section 4.1, we prove part 2 of Theorem 15. Then in Section 4.2, we prove part 1 of Theorem 15. Update rule.
, is streamed, update the matrices by the following
2. Compute a matrix U ∈ R m×t whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space of Y c and matrix V ∈ R t×(m+n) whose rows are an orthonormal basis for the row space of Y r .
Compute a SVD of SU
5. Output the matrix UU comprising of left singular vectors, diagonal matrix Σ and the matrix V T V comprising of right-singular vectors. Denote by
Case 2:
Compute
2. Compute a matrix U ∈ R (m+n)×t whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space of Y c and matrix V ∈ R t×n whose rows are an orthonormal basis for the row space of Y r .
Compute a SVD of TU
5. Output the matrix UU comprising of left singular vectors, diagonal matrix Σ and the matrix V T V comprising of right-singular vectors. Denote by 
Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 15
Lemma 16. If σ min and ρ be as in Theorem 15, then the algorithm presented in Figure 2 , Private-SpaceOptimal-LRF, is (3ε, 3δ)-differentially private.
Proof. We prove the lemma when m ≤ n. The case for m ≥ n is analogous after inverting the roles of Φ and Ψ. Let A and A be two neighboring matrices, i.e., E = A − A = uv T . Then A and A , constructed by Optimal-Space-Private-LRF, has the following property: A = A + E 0 .
Claim 17. If ρ 1 = (1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε and ρ 2 = (1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε, then publishing Y r and Z preserves(2ε, 2δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. We use the second claims of Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, i.e., SD 2
F for all D, where S ∼ D A and Ψ ∼ D R . Let A and A be two neighboring matrices such that
Publishing Z preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy follows from considering the vector form of the matrix S AT T and N 2 and applying Theorem 11. Similarly, we use Theorem 11 and the fact that, for any matrix C of appropriate dimension, ΨC 2 = (1 ± α) C 2 F , to prove that publishing Ψ A + N 1 preserves differential privacy.
We next prove that Y c is (ε, δ)-differentially private. This would complete the proof of Lemma 16 as the lemma would follow by combining Lemma 9 and Theorem 10. One of the key ideas behind the proof is an application of one of the results of Sarlos [58] . Sarlos [58] observed that since any distribution satisfying the JLP is an isometry, if A has a full-row rank and Φ satisfies (α, δ)-JLP, then with probability 1 − δ, the singular values of AΦ are within a multiplicative factor (1 ± α) 1/2 of A.
F for any matrix W with probability 1 − δ (second claim of Lemma 7). Therefore, Φ T v = (1 + α) 1/2 v for some unit vector v. That is, uv T Φ = (1 + α) 1/2 u v T for some unit vectors u and v.We now show that AΦΩ 1 preserves privacy. We prove that each row of the published matrix preserves (ε 0 , δ 0 )-differential privacy for some appropriate ε 0 , δ 0 , and then invoke Theorem 10 to prove that the published matrix preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
The proof of privacy follows the same line as the proof of Blocki et al. [6] ; however, we need to take care of two things. First, the definition of neighboring matrices considered in this paper is different from that of Blocki et al. [6] . To recall, Blocki et al. [6] considered two matrices neighboring if they differ in at most one row by a unit norm. In our case, we consider two matrices are neighboring if they have the form uv T for unit vectors u, v. Secondly, we multiply the Gaussian matrix to AΦ and not to A, as in Blocki et al. [6] . However, this is not a problem because Φ satisfies (α, δ)-JLP because of the choice of t. Since the rank of A and AΦ are the same with probability 1 − δ, the singular values of AΦ are within a multiplicative factor of (1 ± α) 1/2 of the singular values of Φ due to Sarlos [58] . Therefore, our proof goes through if we scale the singular values of A appropriately. In this sense, we generalize the privacy result of Blocki et al. [6] .
Denote by A = A σ min I m and by A = A σ min I m , where
C be the SVD of C = AΦ and U C Σ C V T C be the SVD of C = A Φ. From above discussion, we know that if A − A = uv T , then C − C = (1 + α) 1/2 u v T for some unit vectors u and v. For notational brevity, in what follows we write u for u and v for v.
Note that both C and C is a full rank matrix because of the construction; therefore CC T is a full dimensional m × m matrix. This implies that the affine transformation of the multi-variate Gaussian is well-defined (both the covariance (CC T ) −1 has full rank and ∆(CC T ) is non-zero). That is, the PDF of the distributions of the rows, corresponding to C and C, is just a linear transformation of N (0, I m×m ). Let y ∼ N (0, 1) t .
We prove the result for a row of the published matrix; the theorem follows from Theorem 10. Let ε 0 = ε √ 4r ln(1/δ) log(1/δ) and δ 0 = δ/2r, Let x be sampled either from N (0, CC T ) or N (0, C C T ). It is straightforward to see that the combination of Claim 18 and 19 proves differential privacy for a row of published matrix. The lemma then follows by an application of Theorem 10 and our choice of ε 0 and δ 0 . Claim 18. Let C and ε 0 be as defined above. Then
Proof. The claim follows simply as in [6] after a slight modification. More concretely, we have ∆(CC T ) = i σ 2 i , where σ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ σ m ≥ σ min (C) are the singular values of C. Let σ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ σ m ≥ σ min ( C) be its singular value for C. There is only one singular value of E and it is √ 1 + α. This is because EE T = (1 + α)vv T . To finish the proof of this claim, we use Theorem 46.
Since the singular values of C − C and C − C are the same, Lidskii's theorem (Theorem 46) gives
Therefore, with probability 1 − δ,
The last inequality holds because Φ ∼ D R satisfies (α, δ)-JLP due to the choice of t (second claim of Lemma 7). Since C and A have same rank, this implies, due to a result by Sarlos [58] , that all the singular values of C are within a (1 ± α) 1/2 multiplicative factor of A (Lemma 48). In other words, 
Proof. Without any loss of generality, we can assume x = Cy. The case for x = Cy is analogous. Let C − C = vu T . Note that E[(Ω) i,j ] = 0 n and COV((Ω) i,j ) = 1 if and only if i = j. Then
Using the singular value decomposition of
Since x ∼ Cy, where y ∼ N (0, 1) t , we can write the above expression as τ 1 τ 2 + τ 3 τ 4 , where
, plugging in the SVD of C and C − C = vu T , and that every term τ i in the above expression is a linear combination of a Gaussian, i.e., each term is distributed as per
, we calculate τ i as below.
.
Using the concentration bound on the Gaussian distribution, each term, τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 , and τ 4 , is less than τ i ln(4/δ 0 ) with probability 1 − δ 0 /2. The second claim follows from the following inequality:
where the second inequality follows from the choice of σ min and the fact that σ min (C)
Combining Claims 18 and 19, Lemma 16 follows.
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 15
In what follows, we analyze the case when m ≤ n. The case when n ≤ m follows analogously due to the symmetry of Private-Space-Optimal-LRF. First note that appending A with an all zero matrix 0 m×m has no effect on its k-rank approximation, i.e., we can analyze A 0 . We break our proof in three main steps.
Part 1 of Theorem 15 follows by fitting together the above three bounds.
Performing step (i).
We start by proving a bound on M k − A F by M k − A F and a small additive term. The following lemma provides such a bound. Lemma 20. Let A be an m × n input matrix, and let A = A σ min I m for σ min defined in Theorem 15.
Proof. The lemma is immediate from the following.
where the first inequality follows from the sub-additivity of norms.
Performing step (ii)
. This is the most involved part of the proof and uses multiple lemmas as follows.
Lemma 21. Let A = A σ min I and denote by M k := UU Σ (VV ) T . Let Φ = ΦΩ. Then with probability 1 − O(δ) over the random coins of the algorithm Private-Space-Optimal-LRF,
Proof. Let B = A+S † N(T † ) T and Φ = t −1 ΩΦ. We first use the relation between min X,r(X)≤k A ΦXΨ A− A and (1 + α) A − [ A] k F shown by Boutsidis et al. [8] . Using the Fact 6 and Lemma 7, if we set A = A in equation (39), we have with probability
Consider the optimization problem:
We have an upper bound on min X,r(X)≤k Y c XY r − B F in the terms of (1 + α) A − [ A] k F and some additive terms. Since V is a matrix whose rows are an orthonormal basis for the row space of Y r and U is a matrix whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space of Y c , we have
Combining equation (12) and equation (13), we have
Claim 22. Let U, V, B, A, S, T and N 2 be as above. Let D A be a distribution that satisfies (α, β)-subspace embedding. Let X = argmin X,r(X)=k S(UX − B) F , then with probability
Proof. Set p = t, D = U and E = B in the statement of Lemma 8. Let us restrict our attention to only rank k matrices X and denote by X = argmin X,r(X)=k UXV − B F and X = argmin X,r(X)=k S(UXV − B)T T F . Then we have with probability
Substituting D = V T , X = (SU X) T and E = (SB) T in the statement of Lemma 8, with probability 1−4δ,
Combining equation (16) with equation (14) and equation (15), we have with probability 1 − O(δ) over the random coins of Private-Optimal-Space-LRF,
This completes the proof of Claim 22.
To finalize the proof, we need to compute X = argmin X,r(X)≤k
Recall,
Substituting equation (18) in equation (17) and the fact that
Scaling the value of α by a constant completes the proof of Lemma 21.
To compute the additive error, we need to bound S † N 2 (T T ) † F and S 2 F . This is done by the following two lemmas. Claim 23. Let D R be a distribution that satisfies (α, β)-subspace embedding for generalized regression. Let S 2 be as defined above. Then with probability
G is a full column rank. This implies that there exist a t × k matrix U with orthonormal columns such that GG † = U U T . Therefore,
From the second claim of Lemma 7 and the choice of the parameter t,
F . Since every entries of N 2 are picked i.i.d. and U U T is an orthonormal projection onto a k-dimensional subspace, we have S 2 F = ρ kn/(1 ± α).
Proof. The proof follows by two applications of Lemma 49.
v×n . Initialize an all zero m × t matrix Y and an all zero v × n matrix Z .
Update rule. Suppose at time τ , the stream is
Compute
2. Compute a matrix U ∈ R m×t whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space of Y.
3. Compute the singular value decomposition of SU ∈ R v×t . Let it be U Σ V T . Using Lemma 47, we know that N 2 F = O(ρv) with probability 99/100. If we instead use the concentration bound of χ 2 -distribution, then N 2 F = O(ρv ) with probability 1 − 2 − 2 v 2 /8 .
Compute the singular value decomposition of
V Σ † [ U T Z] k . Let it be U Σ V T . 5. Output UU , Σ and V . Let M k = UU Σ V T .
Performing step (iii).
In order to complete the proof, we compute an upper bound on A − [ A] k F . For this, we need the Weyl's perturbation theorem: Theorem 25. For any m × n matrices P, Q, we have |σ i (P + Q) − σ i (P)| ≤ Q 2 , where σ i (·) denotes the i-th singular value and Q 2 is the spectral norm of the matrix Q. 
The result follows by setting the values of ρ and σ min .
5 Efficient-update and Optimal-error Differentially-private LRF Under Priv 2
In the previous section, we gave an space-optimal (when k ≥ 1/α) and optimal additive error algorithm for LRF under Priv 1 . In this section, we show a differentially private algorithm that outputs a k-rank factorization of an m × n matrix under an even stronger level of privacy, Priv 2 . Our idea is to show that the algorithm of Clarkson and Woodruff [13] can be made to work in the turnstile update model while incurring optimal additive error. The main result of this section is the following theorem. Theorem 28. Let m, n ∈ N and α, ε, δ be the input parameters. Let k be the desired rank of the factorization and let s = max{m, n}. Given a private input matrix A ∈ R m×n streamed in a turnstile model, the factorization U, Σ, V outputted by the algorithm, Private-Frobenius-LRF, presented in Figure 3 satisfies the following properties:
1. Private-Frobenius-LRF outputs a low rank factorization such that, with probability 99/100 over the coins of the algorithm,
where
2. Private-Frobenius-LRF is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
3. The space used by Private-Frobenius-LRF is O((m + nα −2 )kα −2 log k log(1/δ)). 
2. Computing the orthonormal basis U requires mt 2 = O(mk 2 α −4 ) time.
3. Computing the SVD of the matrix SU requires vt 2 = O(k 3 α 7 ).
Computation of
[ U T Z] k requires nv 2 = O(nk 2 α −6 ) time.
Computation of the SVD in
Step 4 requires nt 2 = O(nk 2 α −4 ) time.
The following lemma proves Part 2 of Theorem 28.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we use the second claims of Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, i.e., for all D, SD 2
Let A and A be two neighboring matrices such that E = A − A has Frobenius norm 1. Then SE 2 F ≤ (1 + α) E 2 F = 1 + α. Publishing Z preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy follows from considering the vector form of the matrix SA and N 2 and Theorem 11. Similarly, we use the fact that, for any matrix C of appropriate dimension, ΦC 2 = (1 ± α) C 2 F , to prove that publishing AΦ + N 1 preserves differential privacy. The lemma follows by applying Lemma 9 and Theorem 10.
We prove part 1 in two stages by decoupling the effect of the noise matrices N 1 and N 2 . In the first step, we assume that the noise N 1 is not introduced and then analyze the algorithm. Later, in Section 5.2, we perform the analysis of the algorithm as presented in Figure 3 .
Simplication Step
We first prove the result without the effect of using N 1 . That is, in the following analysis, we consider U 0 , a matrix whose columns are formed by an orthonormal basis of the column-space of AΦ instead of U, a matrix whose columns are formed by an orthonormal basis of the column-space of AΦ + N 1 . In this case, we show that U 0 V Σ † [ U T Z] k is a good approximation of A. We show the following Theorem 30.
, where U 0 is as defined above and rest of the terms as defined in Figure 3 . Then with probability 1 − O(δ) over Φ ∼ D R and S ∼ D A ,
Proof. We prove this lemma using few claims. Lemma 31. Let A be the input matrix. Let Φ ∼ D R , S ∼ D A be as in Figure 3 . Let B = A + S † N 2 for N 2 defined as in Figure 3 . Then min X,r(X)≤k
Complete Analysis
In this section, we prove the utility guarantee of Theorem 28. We first show the following result.
k be the product of the factorization outputted by the algorithm in Figure 3 . Then with probability
Proof. We prove the result by proving a series of results. We provide an upper and a lower bound on min X,r(X)≤k YX − B F in terms of A − [A] k F and the output of the algorithm.
Lemma 36. Let A be the input matrix. Let Φ ∼ D R , S ∼ D A be as in Figure 3 . Let Y = ΦA + N 1 and B = A + S † N 2 for N 1 , N 2 as defined in Figure 3 . Then with probability
Proof. Set r = k, P = [A] T k , and Q = A T in Lemma 7. Then using Lemma 7, we have 
The result follows using Markov's inequality and the fact that CΦ 2
Theorem 28 now follows from Lemma 34, Lemma 38, Theorem 35, and the choice of ρ in Lemma 29.
6 Lower-bound for Low-rank Factorization When γ = 0
We give a reduction to the augmented indexing problem, AIND. It is defined as follows. The communication complexity for solving AIND is well known due to the result of Miltersen et al. [51] . Theorem 40. The minimum bits of communication required to solve AIND with probability 2/3, when the message is sent only in one direction, i.e., either from Alice to Bob or from Bob to Alice, is Ω(n). This lower bound holds even if the index, ind, and the string, x, is chosen uniformly at random.
The space lower bound in streaming model is shown by showing that a one-pass streaming algorithm Alg yields a single round communication protocol for some function f . The idea is as follows. On input x, Alice invokes Alg on its input to compute Alg(x). She then sends the state to Bob, who computes Alg(x y) using his input y, and uses this to compute the function f . The communication is therefore the same as the space required by the algorithm. In what follows, we use the notation C :i to denote the i-th column of the matrix C. Theorem 41. Let m, n, k ∈ N and α > 0. Then any randomized single-pass algorithm for (α, 5/6, O(m + n), k)-LRA in the general turnstile model uses Ω((m + n)k/α) words.
Proof. We adapt the proof of Clarkson and Woodruff [11] for the case when γ = 0. Suppose m ≥ n and let a = k/20α. Without loss of generality, a can be assumed to be at most n/2. Let be the word size. We assume Alice has a string x ∈ {−1, +1}
(m−a)a and Bob has an index ind ∈ [(m − a)a]. The idea is to define the matrix A with high Frobenius norm. The matrix A is the summation of the matrix A constructed by Alice andĀ constructed by Bob. Alice constructs its matrix A as follows. We partition the set [a] in sets I 1 , · · · , I such that
We form a bijection between entries of x and the entries of M in the following manner. Every entry of M I i is defined by a unique bit of x, i.e., (
Suppose Bob is given an index ind ∈ [(m − a)a] such that x ind corresponds to the sub-matrix M I θ . Then we can assume that Bob also knows every entry in the sub-matrix M I θ for θ > θ. Bob forms a second level partition of the columns of M I θ in to k size groups G 1 , · · · , G a/k of size a/ . Due to our construction, there exists a unique r such that x ind maps to an entry in the sub-matrix formed by columns indexed by one of the second level partition G r . Let G r = {c, c + 1, · · · , c + k − 1} be the columns corresponding to the k-size group of I θ in which ind is present. As its input, Bob streams a matrixĀ which is an all-zero matrix, except for entriesĀ c+i,c+i = ζ for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. In other words, Bob inserts a scaled identity matrix in the stream, where the scaling parameter ζ is large enough to make sure that most of the error of any randomized algorithm is due to other columns of A. We set the value of ζ as a large polynomial in the error of the algorithm.
Alice runs its randomized single-pass algorithm for k-rank approximation on A and send the state to Bob. Bob completes the streaming algorithm using the state received by Alice and by streaming its own matrixĀ. Therefore, the one-pass randomized algorithm gets as input a matrix A = A +Ā and it is required to output a rank-k matrix B with additive error γ = O(m + n). We will show that any such an output allows us to solve AIND. Denote by A Gr the sub-matrix formed by the columns c, c+1, · · · , c+k−1.
Let us first understand the properties of the constructed matrix A. To compute the Frobenius norm of this matrix, we need to consider two cases: the case for sub-matrices in which ind belongs, i.e, M Ir , and the rest of the matrix. For the sub-matrix corresponding to the columns indexed by G r , the columns of A I θ have Euclidean length (ζ 2 + (m − a)100 θ ) 1/2 . For θ < θ, every columns have Euclidean norm (a(m − a)) 1/2 10 θ . Therefore, we have the following:
In order to solve (α, β, γ, k)-LRF, the algorithm needs to output B of rank at most k such that, with probability 1 − β over its random coins, (ii) Bound the error incurred by A − B F in terms of the columns indexed by G r .
The idea is to show that most of the error is due to the other columns in B; and therefore, sign in the columns in A indexed by G r agrees with that of the signs of those columns in B. This allows Bob to solve the AIND problem as Bob can just output the sign of the corresponding position.
Let R := {ra/k + 1, · · · , (r + 1)a/k} and C := {c, · · · , c + k − 1}.
The following lemma proves that when ζ is large enough, then the columns of B corresponding to index set I r are linearly independent. This proves part (i) of our proof idea. 
From the construction, since Bob inserts a sub-matrix ζI k , we know that
From equation (35) and choice of ζ, for all j, we have Y j,j ≥ Υ 2 . Further, equation (36) implies that Y p,j ≤ √ Υ. Letĩ be the index in {1, · · · , k} \ {i} for which |aĩ| attains the maximum value. Then
Now consider theĩ-entry of Y :i . Note thatĩ = i. Since Υ depends quadratically on m and γ, we have
This is a contradiction because Y p,j ≤ √ Υ due to equation (36) for p = j. This completes the proof.
The following lemma proves part (ii) of our proof idea. Lemma 43. Let V :1 , · · · , V :k be the columns of B(C) and V :1 , · · · , V :k be the restriction of these vectors to the rows a + 1, · · · , n. Then column i of B can be written as linear combination of real numbers a i,1 , · · · a i,k of the vectors V :1 , · · · , V :k such that, for all j and i ∈ R, η 2 i,j ≤ 4/Υ 3 .
Proof. Let M :1 , · · · M :a be the columns of M. The i-th row of B can be represented as η i,j V :j , for real numbers η i,j , not all of which are identically zero. Then We can now complete the proof. First note that since M is a signed matrix, each V i in the third term of the above expression is at least √ Υ. Therefore, for all i / ∈ S and all j 
A Auxiliary Results
We need the following result about product of pseudo-inverse in the proof of Lemma 49 and Claim 51. Theorem 44. Let A and B be conforming matrices and either, 1. A has orthonormal columns (i.e., A T A is an identity matrix) or, 2. B has orthonormal rows (i.e., BB T is an identity matrix), then (AB) † = B † A † .
We use the following variant of Pythagorean theorem in the proof of Lemma 14. Theorem 45. (Pythagorean theorem). Let A and B be two matrices such that A T B is an zero matrix. Then for any C = A + B, we have C 2 F = A 2 F + B 2 F . We also need the following results for the privacy proof. Proof. The lemma follows from the following computation.
The result follows using Markov's inequality. The second part of the lemma follows similarly using the fact that σ min = min x∈R m , x 2 =1 AΦx 2 and y 2 2 ≥ (1 − α). Proof. One way to look at the action of S when it is a subsampled Hadamard transform is that it is a product of matrices W and Π 1..r , where Π 1..r is the matrix formed by the first r rows of a random permutation matrix and W is a randomized Walsh-Hadamard matrix formed by multiplying a Walsh-Hadamard matrix with a diagonal matrix whose non-zero entries are picked i.i. 
rank-k matrix B k such that
where |||·||| denotes either the spectral or the Frobenius norm.
Dwork et al. [28] consider two matrices neighbouring if they differ by at most one row. They further assume that the rows are normalized; therefore, their definition of neighbouring matrices is the same as Hardt and Roth [34] .
Difference from this paper. We consider low-rank factorization of both the right and the left singular vectors while Problem 4 studied low-rank "approximation" of the right singular vectors. Moreover, granularity of privacy we consider is more general than theirs.
Lemma 52. Let B and C be two conforming matrices. Let σ min (B) be the least non-zero singular value of B and σ max (B) be the largest singular value of B. Then
Proof. Let B = [B 1 , . . . , B n ] be the column partitioning of B, then the definition of the Frobenius norm, we have
Using the fact that σ min (C) = min for all i, we have Therefore, we have
or, σ min (C) B F ≤ CB F ≤ σ max (C) B F .
